Voter Fraud

  • Fair Elections
    • Concerns
      • Technical include: aging infrastructure, cybersecurity, outdated software, funding gaps
      • Operational: mishandling ballots, withholding mail-in ballots, tampering with equipment
      • Political: leaders pressuring election officials to change outcomes, intimidation at polling places, misinformation, eroding public trust
    • Bottom line: There's no credible evidence of the kind of systemic fraud that would change national election outcomes — audits, paper trails, and multi-party oversight remain in place.
      • There are documented cases of election fraud in local races. If the number of voters participating in an election is small, Individual votes can have an outsized impact.
      • The conservative Heritage Foundation concluded the documented fraud rate over the last 40+ years was around .0000845% of ballots cast., Documented cases did not change election outcomes at scale.
      • Disclaimer: If you have credible proof of a Federal or Statewide election outcome altered by fraud please provide the evidence and we will revise this information accordingly.
    • The SAVE Act (Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act, H.R. 22)
      • The stated intention of the SAVE Act is to eliminate noncitizen voters.
      • Is the actual intent to safeguard our election system?
      • Or is the intent to demonize non-citizens and disenfranchise legitimate voters?
      •  Paperwork requirements, documentation costs, restrictions on mail-in voting

Below you will find a risk assessment of threats to our election system as analyzed by Claude AI.

THE QUESTION - What are the major threats to the US Federal and State election system. The analysis should include: foreign interference, political interference as exemplified by Trumps' request to Brad [Raffensperger], unqualified auditors exemplified by Cyber Ninjas and non-citizen voters. Please provide the analysis in order of likelihood to change the outcome of an election.

Here's an analysis of these four threats, ranked by their realistic potential to change an election outcome — from most to least consequential.

  1. Political interference with certification/counting — highest outcome-changing potential

This is the most dangerous category because it targets the last step in the process: the counting and certifying of already-cast votes, where there are fewer independent checks than at the ballot-casting stage.

The clearest example is the January 2, 2021 recorded phone call in which then-President Trump asked Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to "find 11,780 votes" — one more than Biden's margin — and suggested Raffensperger and his counsel could face criminal exposure if they failed to act. Raffensperger refused, and the certified result stood. This episode illustrates the mechanism that election-security experts consider the single greatest structural vulnerability: American elections are administered by thousands of officials, many of whom are individually electable or appointable partisans, and the system's integrity in a contested race can hinge on the willingness of one or two individuals to resist pressure. A different official, in a different state, with different personal calculus, could in principle have acted differently. Unlike hacking a voting machine or importing fraudulent ballots — both technically difficult and easily detected — pressuring a handful of certifying officials is comparatively cheap, requires no technical sophistication, and (as January 6 also demonstrated) can be paired with mass pressure campaigns and threats of violence against election workers. This is why it ranks highest: it's the threat vector most directly connected to changing a certified outcome, and it came within one person's refusal of succeeding in at least one instance.

  1. Partisan "audits" by unqualified actors — low direct risk to the audited election, higher risk to future ones

The Cyber Ninjas review of Maricopa County, Arizona (2020) is illustrative. The Arizona Senate hired a Florida-based cybersecurity firm with no election-audit experience, whose CEO had previously promoted "Stop the Steal" claims. Cyber Ninjas' own draft findings showed Trump received 261 fewer votes than the official canvass and Biden received 99 more — in other words, the "audit" reconfirmed Biden's win. Independent reviewers called the report "laced with nonsense," including a recommendation to scrutinize over 10,000 voters simply for sharing a name and birth year with another voter, and internal communications later showed the review had been launched with the predetermined goal of finding fraud to discredit the 2020 results. A separate analysis found the hand count itself fell short by roughly 16,000 ballots, contradicting the audit's own claim that its count nearly matched the official results.

Because this kind of audit happens after certification and doesn't itself alter vote totals, it has essentially zero direct capacity to change the outcome it examines. Its real danger is second-order: it manufactures a false evidentiary basis that can be used to justify refusing certification in a future race, to pass restrictive election laws, or to fuel the kind of pressure campaign described in category 1. Ranked as a mid-tier threat — high in its capacity to corrode trust and enable future interference, low in its capacity to change the election it's ostensibly auditing.

  1. Foreign interference — real, but historically aimed at influence rather than vote tampering

U.S. intelligence agencies (ODNI, CISA, FBI) have documented sustained Russian, Iranian, and Chinese efforts around recent election cycles, but these efforts have consistently focused on disinformation, hack-and-leak operations, and sowing distrust — not on directly altering vote counts. There is no confirmed instance of a foreign actor changing tallied results in a U.S. federal election; the decentralized, paper-trail-heavy nature of the U.S. system (different machines, different vendors, different jurisdictions administering discrete pieces of the count) makes large-scale tampering extremely difficult to execute undetected. The realistic risk is influence on the margins of public opinion or turnout, which is measurable but very hard to isolate as outcome-determinative in any specific race, and disruption/DDoS-type attacks on the periphery (voter registration databases, results-reporting websites) rather than the count itself. Serious threat to information integrity and public confidence; low probability of directly flipping a result.

  1. Non-citizen voting — negligible

This is the least consequential by a wide margin, and the data is unusually well-documented because of extensive post-2024 audits. A Michigan citizenship audit comparing 7.9 million driving records against 7.2 million voter records found 16 apparent noncitizens who had cast a ballot in the 2024 election — about 0.00028% of votes cast. Georgia's audit of 8.2 million registered voters found just 20 noncitizens registered, of whom only 9 had ever voted, mostly before the state's 2012 verification system existed; nationwide, federal citizenship-verification data show only about 0.04% of checked cases return as noncitizens. Idaho found 36 potential noncitizens among over a million registered voters, and Louisiana's 40-year review of records found 390 suspected noncitizen registrants out of 2.9 million voters — registrants, not even confirmed voters. Rutgers researcher Lorraine Minnite, who has studied voter fraud allegations for over a decade, and the Cato Institute have both found the studies claiming large-scale noncitizen voting to be methodologically discredited. The consistent finding across red and blue states alike is that confirmed cases run in the dozens out of tens of millions of ballots, are typically registration errors rather than intentional fraud, and have never been shown to approach the margin of any federal race.

Summary ranking

Threat Direct outcome-changing potential
Political pressure on certifying officials Highest — targets the final step; came close to success once
Partisan pseudo-audits Low direct, but high indirect (erodes trust, enables future interference)
Foreign interference Low-moderate — real but historically aimed at influence, not tallies
Non-citizen voting Negligible — statistically vanishing in every audit conducted

The throughline worth noting: the threats with the most documented real-world evidence of actually occurring (Raffensperger call, Cyber Ninjas) are the ones with the least basis in the data (non-citizen voting), while the threat most often invoked to justify new restrictions is the one least supported by the evidence.

 

  • State audits show inconsequential impact by non-citizens.
    • Michigan found 16 noncitizens cast a 2024 ballot - about 0.00028% of votes cast.
    • Iowa found 35 noncitizen voters cast a 2024 ballot – about 0.01% of votes cast.
    • Georgia found 9 noncitizens of more than 5 million 2024 voters had cast ballots in previous elections.
    • Idaho, Arkansas, Tennessee, Montana, Louisiana found potential-noncitizen rates ranging from roughly 0.0001% to 0.013% of registered voters. A review of Louisiana voting records, over a 40 year period, identified 390 suspected noncitizen registrants.
  • There are only a few hundred confirmed, audited cases of noncitizen ballots cast nationally over decades. The noncitizen ballots are consistently under 0.01% of votes cast in any state that has checked.
  • Disclaimer: If you have confirmed audited proof of noncitizen voting that refutes this information please provide the evidence and we will revise this information accordingly.